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Community-Based Counterterrorism: What 





France has been the victim of twelve high-profile terrorist attacks since 2012, despite 
its heavy-handed, legalistic approach to counterterrorism. The United Kingdom, in com-
parison, has undergone only one major attack since 2007. Is the British counterterrorism 
model, which focuses on engagement with community organizations and non govern-
mental organizations (NGOs), proving more successful than the French approach? This 
paper proposes that France’s security forces should consider adopting aspects of the British 
community-based counter-radicalization model.
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Introduction
Great Britain and France and their security forces have long dealt with acts of terror-
ism, whether through combating domestic terror groups or conducting counterinsurgency 
operations in former colonial possessions. Given their vastly different historical experiences, 
it is not surprising that the two countries developed different approaches to combating ter-
rorism. For years, the French model of counterterrorism was regarded as being superior to 
the British model. Immediately following the 7/7 London bombings, France’s policies were 
lauded by American neoconservatives as a shining example of effective counterterrorism. 
However, recent Islamist attacks across France raise the question whether the French model 
is failing, and whether the lack of large-scale terrorist attacks against the United Kingdom 
(UK)over the last several years sheds proof that the UK’s community-inclusive model is, 
in fact, superior? This paper argues that the British approach to counterterrorism has, over 
time, proven to be more effective in combating extremism than the French approach, and 
that applying several aspects of the United Kingdom’s model to France’s own efforts would 
be beneficial to their current counterterrorism initiatives.
The British Model: CONTEST in Action
The attacks in the United States on September 11th, combined with the rioting wit-
nessed throughout the summer of 2001, forced London to reevaluate its response to terror-
ism. Until this point, the perspective of British anti-terrorism experts was primarily outward 
looking and did not properly address the role that the UK’s disenchanted Muslim popula-
tions could potentially play if the UK decided to participate in the United States' Global 
War on Terror (GWOT). The post-9/11 environment exacerbated the British Muslim 
sense of oppression originating from Western capitals, leading to a rise in vulnerability to 
radicalization within the Muslim community. According to a Pew Research Center poll 
conducted in 2006, of Britain’s 1.8 million Muslims, 47% reported feeling that “there was 
conflict in being a devout Muslim and living in a Western society.” John Mackinlay, a Brit-
ish counterterrorism expert, believes that this conflicting identity provides ample opportu-
nity for violent organizations to find new recruits (2009, p. 206).
Realizing the increasingly volatile sentiment developing within the UK’s Muslim 
population, Whitehall began to investigate options for countering the extremist threat. In a 
letter from the Foreign Office, British diplomatic officials expressed their concerns on the 
issue to the Cabinet Office:
“This disillusionment may contribute to a sense of helplessness with regard to the 
situation of Muslims in the world, with a lack of any tangible ‘pressure valves,’ 
in order to vent frustrations, anger or dissent. Hence this may lead to a desire 
for a simple ‘Islamic’ solution to the perceived oppression/problems faced by the 
‘Ummah (Geive, 2004, p. 3).” 
In order to inculcate a feeling of inclusion among these marginalized communities and 
provide ‘pressure valves’ in response to potential radicalization, the Home Office introduced 
a program titled Operation CONTEST, which became public knowledge in 2006. 
CONTEST innovatively establishes a community-based approach to counter-terror-
ism. According to the Home Office, the Prevent strategy, a key element of CONTEST, 
aims “to stop people becoming terrorists or supporting terrorism.” It does so by combat-
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ing extremism at its roots by facilitating cooperation between state services, such as police 
forces, recreational centers, social services, and probation programs, and local community 
trend-setters, including religious groups, youth-focused charities, and educational institu-
tions, among others. By coordinating their efforts with civil society, the Home Office is 
able to compete for the “hearts and minds” of at-risk communities. By equipping local 
organizations, particularly those of a religious and charitable nature, with the resources they 
need to stand up to extremist propaganda, violent ideology is countered on ideological and 
theological levels, thereby lessening the impact that terrorist recruiters may have on disaf-
fected youth (Home Office, 2011). The Prevent strategy has proven to be successful in its 
outreach efforts. According to a 2008 report from the Department for Communities and 
Local Government, as many as 44,000 at-risk individuals had been engaged by the Prevent 
strategy in 2007 alone, primarily through youth activities and cultural outreach programs 
(Thomas, 2012, p. 64). 
Additionally, as part of the Prevent strategy, disaffected segments of the population are 
given a local voice concerning potentially volatile actions perceived to be anti-immigrant 
or anti-Muslim. For instance, during the December 2008 – January 2009 Israeli military 
actions in Gaza, protests and town hall meetings by activists were organized with the fore-
knowledge and acceptance of borough council level services, including local police. Coop-
eration with community activists gives those with grievances a greater sense that the gov-
ernment considers their complaints to be legitimate, and thus their protests enter into the 
wider stream of British political discourse instead of remaining on the ignored fringes. The 
vast majority of those who participate in these meetings “return to normal life” and “the 
community resumes a calmer tempo,” thus demonstrating that the legitimizing nature of 
CONTEST’s Prevent strategy provides a “pressure valve” for actively disaffected segments 
of the community (Mackinlay, 2009, pp. 214-215).
In response to criticisms that Prevent’s outreach programs did not facilitate contact 
with wider British society, the Department for Communities and Local Government 
(DCLG) has gradually expanded the opportunities for at-risk youths to participate in orga-
nizations such as Army Cadets, the Scouts Association, Girlguiding UK, and Together in Service, 
an organization that facilitates connecting youth interested in faith-based social action. By 
making involvement in such institutions more widely available, the DCLG hopes to show 
to these communities that “British values are Muslim values,” and, “Islam and its message of 
peace and unity makes our country a better and stronger place” (Dawson, 2016, pp. 11-12). 
Demonstrating the positive contributions these communities can play in the political and 
social life of the UK creates a desire for participation instead of opposition to British society. 
The Prevent strategy is not without its critics. The program has opponents on both 
sides of the political spectrum. Some on the political right resent the idea of community 
engagement in counter-radicalization operations, and believe that a more heavy-handed 
approach ought to be implemented. Those who raise these objections should be directed to 
the successes of CONTEST. Government and private reports show that support for violent 
extremism has waned in recent years. Both the Office for Security and Counter-Terrorism 
and the International Center for the Study of Radicalisation have stated that they have no-
ticed a decrease in sympathy for Islamist terrorism among migrant communities.
This decrease is reflected in conviction records. In 2011, only four people were con-
victed of terror-related crimes, down from 19 in 2010 and a high of 51 in 2006. While 
other factors (including the Arab Spring) may have eroded support for violent extremism, 
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the fact that such a remarkable decrease has been observed since CONTEST went public 
supports the postulation that it has been effective in undermining and countering extremism 
(Vaz, 2012, p. 7). Additionally, the United Kingdom has only experienced one large-scale 
terrorist attack since the introduction of CONTEST, namely the botched 2007 Glasgow 
Airport attack. A decrease in violent extremism and the prevention of mass-casualty attacks 
suggest that, despite protestations from those wanting more crackdowns and less integration, 
CONTEST does indeed work. It works for two reasons.
First, the British government is correct in believing that violent extremism can only 
be properly countered through winning over the hearts and minds of disenfranchised com-
munities. Within such populations, in which the state has lost (or never had) a degree of 
its legitimacy, solutions to communal problems are most effective when they are organic 
and originate from the community in question. British counter-radicalization efforts would 
not enjoy the same success if British Muslims were not provided the space and resources 
through which “bad” interpretations of Islam can be discussed and confronted on the local 
level. It would not be nearly as effective if the only counter-argument to extremist ideology 
came from the same (typically white, Christian) authorities with which disgruntled youths 
are frustrated in the first place.
Second, the Home Office is wise in implementing an approach to counter-radicaliza-
tion that seeks prevention before prosecution. The CONTEST model’s ability to distin-
guish between prevention and pursuit (wherein law enforcement works to disrupt active 
terrorist cells and operations) facilitates a greater sense of belonging and inclusion into the 
culture of the modern United Kingdom. It seeks for (and succeeds in developing) a feeling 
of ownership of British society, thereby mitigating the risk that violence will be used in re-
sponse to perceived oppression. While kicking in doors and conducting arrests may ensure 
public safety in the short term, it does not change the culture of at-risk communities for the 
better. When used in isolation, these tactics serve to further alienate potential extremists. 
Unfortunately, the French counterterrorism model focuses on precisely these tactics.
The French Model: Prosecution First, Integration Second
The French approach to counterterrorism, in stark contrast to CONTEST, is over-
whelmingly judicial and legalistic. French security forces and the judiciary have historically 
treated terrorism as a serious crime, but as essentially nothing more than crime. The bel-
licose rhetoric commonly associated with the GWOT in English-language media has only 
begun to be used in the wake of the November 2015 Paris attacks. In explaining his govern-
ment’s refusal to use the term, François Thuillier, a counterterrorism official in the French 
Ministry of the Interior, said of the language of the GWOT that, “to be at war gives to the 
enemy the status of a genuine army, the status of a partner on the battlefield, which means 
that it gives to these people a rationality, a strategy…that’s exactly what they want us to 
think of them. They want to be seen as an international army, and to be at war with these 
people is already their first victory” (Thuillier, 2014). To do otherwise would risk legitimiz-
ing the identity terrorists seek.
By using strictly legal speech and tactics in addressing issues of terrorism, France departs 
from the American expeditionary model, and the British, quasi-counterinsurgency model. 
France, instead, pursues domestic terrorists in much the same way it handles organized 
crime. Security forces utilize sweeping powers of surveillance and human intelligence. The 
judiciary exercises very permissive rules of preventative arrest, extradition, and sentencing. 
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Counterterrorism is a legal affair, and French civil society, particularly Muslim civil society, 
has no official role to play. Security services may reach out to organizations such as the 
French Muslim Council, but not out of a desire to form a formal partnership. Francesco 
Ragazzi of Sciences Po, a leading political science university, stated that
“In practice, Metropolitan intelligence services can form close bonds with ‘com-
munity’ representatives, but these are just informal exchanges from positions of 
unequal relationships of power, which do not imply official recognition of their 
role as representatives” (2014, p. 10). 
Human Rights Watch and other rights-focused NGOs have heavily criticized this ap-
proach, saying that it promotes the feeling of exclusion that already characterizes the prevail-
ing attitude of French migrant communities.
While it’s difficult to attribute stability to one policing program, France, nevertheless, 
was spared the kind of large-scale attacks that traumatized Madrid, London, and Moscow. 
Between 2001 and 2012, France did not experience a single massive terrorist attack. Because 
of this success, the French model was held up as an example of effective counterterrorism for 
years, including by US neoconservatives and British critics of CONTEST. These security 
policies have, however, left the communities from which terrorists draw their recruits feel-
ing even more marginalized and oppressed. 
Currently, unlike what is intended to occur under the British CONTEST model, the 
disaffected French Muslim’s only interaction with the Ministry of the Interior is likely to 
be with law enforcement (Klausen, 2009, pp. 403-420). Growing frustration has provided 
fertile ground for radicalization. Polling shows that support for violent extremism in France 
is prevalent. A 2006 Pew Research Center poll of the attitudes of young French Muslims 
found that 42% of those between 18 and 29 years old believed that suicide bombings were 
justifiable (2006, p. 60).
Since 2012, France has been the victim of twelve high-profile terror attacks, several 
of which caused mass casualties. The majority of those who carried out these attacks were 
French or Belgian citizens, meaning that the terrorist threat to France more often than not 
originates within its own borders, and not some distant safe haven. This uptick of attacks 
leaves open the question of this policy’s long-term effectiveness. Can such a model, which 
leaves marginalized communities without a peaceful “pressure valve,” continue to serve 
France, especially in the wake of the terrible unrest experienced by the Middle East follow-
ing the Arab Spring? Can France protect itself from extremism while continuing its military 
operations in Muslim-majority nations? Following Mohammed Merah’s rampage through 
southern France in 2012, many wondered if Paris should double down on its methods and 
increase its powers of surveillance and arrest. It was postulated that such abilities would 
have allowed French authorities to become aware of Merah’s radicalization before he could 
strike. Perhaps a better question to ask would be, “if Merah had had access to the services 
offered by British Muslim civil society, would he have been radicalized at all” (Cazi, 2012).
The Argument for French Civil Society in Counter-Radicalization
The recent tragedies in Paris indicate that the French counterterrorism model is fail-
ing to adequately protect France. Security officials have been forced to reflect on how to 
improve their methods. As authorities reevaluate their approach to violent extremism, they 
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should consider what aspects of CONTEST might help to ease the social pressure that is 
building in disaffected migrant communities.
Connecting with and strengthening Muslim civil society can aid France in its fight 
against terror in several ways. Encouraging outreach programs will provide an alternative to 
the extremist ideology that is commonly spread through France’s prison systems. Strength-
ening faith-based NGOs can give moderate viewpoints a greater voice in the religious 
dialogue. In times when France is engaged in armed conflict within the Muslim world, 
community organizations can provide the disaffected with a constructive method of protest 
that does not involve violence. In short, moderate Muslims would have a greater ability to 
dissuade would-be recruits from becoming involved in extremist violence.
There are two primary obstacles to the implementation of a Prevent-like policy in 
France. The concept of laïcité makes French lawmakers very wary of allowing the state to 
wander into matters of religion. Ragazzi states that laïcité makes it difficult for “politicians to 
make the distinction between “good” and “bad” Islam, contrary to the United Kingdom, 
which does not hesitate to describe bad interpretations of Islam in its official documents.” 
(2014, p. 10) The encouragement and funding of faith-based NGOs may be interpreted 
as a violation of the separation between church and state. It may create tension with other 
religious organizations that may question why the government is upholding one strain of 
religious thought over others. But Paris has shown a high degree of flexibility with ques-
tions of laïcité in the past. As part of regaining control of Alsace-Lorraine in the aftermath of 
World War II, France agreed to continue state support of the Catholic Church, including 
being responsible for the income of the Church’s priests in the region, despite this being an 
obvious breach of the political norm. In considering strengthening faith-based NGOs that 
work in the Muslim community, France would be wise to exercise a similar degree of flex-
ibility. France would benefit from exercising a similar degree of flexibility by strengthening 
faith-based NGOs whose work focuses on the Muslim community.
The second obstacle to a Prevent-inspired program is the overarching distrust of civil 
society that characterizes French politics. Interest groups are viewed with suspicion. In a 
culture that emphasizes the common good, they are viewed as seeking undeserved private 
privilege for a limited few. Jonah D. Levy points out the ways that this distrust of civil so-
ciety has stunted the growth of France, stating that the lack of a developed civil society has 
“deprived French officials of valuable policy resources: information for effec-
tive policy design; mobilization of participants who may be wary of government 
initiatives in a flexible, decentralized manner; diffusion of responsibility… and 
political legitimation in support of painful but necessary reforms.” (Levy, 2009, 
p. 10).
The Muslim immigrant communities and security forces of France would greatly ben-
efit from a blossoming of civil society for the reasons listed above. In the eyes of a disen-
franchised community, state-centered initiatives will not dissuade youth from turning to 
violence. Community-based outreach programs, staffed by locals, will have greater success 
in countering extremist propaganda than any government office or official. Allowing civil 
society to play a greater role in countering extremism will also free up state resources, which 
could be redirected to other counterterrorism initiatives. For these reasons, Paris should 
consider cooperating with and encourage the development of civil society within at-risk 
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communities.
Conclusion
The success of the British CONTEST program, with its emphasis on the Prevent 
strategy, has suggested that community-centered counterterrorism may be a healthier way 
to tackle extremism over the long-term. Providing disaffected communities with a voice of 
protest and a platform from which they can openly counter Islamist propaganda has helped 
to reduce the number of successful terrorist attacks carried out in the UK, which has not had 
a large-scale incident in over a decade. In comparison, the French counterterrorism model 
has failed to prevent (and may partly be to blame for) an uptick in terrorist activity over 
the last several years, in which attacks have become more sophisticated and deadly. Chang-
ing strategy and implementing community-based counter-radicalization policies would give 
moderate voices more of a chance of succeeding in the war of ideas currently being waged 
in the streets, mosques, and chat rooms of France.
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